releasetools: Support validating Verified Boot images.
For a given (signed) target-files.zip, this CLs allows verifying the
Verified Boot related images. It works with both of VB 1.0 and VB 2.0
images.
As part of the CL, it also moves validate_target_files.py to argparse,
which is more flexible than the traditional getopt module.
Also add unittests for the VB 1.0 path. VB 2.0 tests will be added in
follow-up CL.
Example usage:
- Run the script on aosp_bullhead target-files.zip.
$ ./build/make/tools/releasetools/validate_target_files.py \
--verity_key build/target/product/security/verity.x509.pem \
--verity_key_mincrypt build/target/product/security/verity_key \
aosp_bullhead-target_files-4522605.zip
- Run the script on aosp_walleye target-files.zip.
$ ./build/make/tools/releasetools/validate_target_files.py \
--verity_key external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa4096.pem \
aosp_walleye-target_files-4627254.zip
Bug: 63706333
Bug: 65486807
Test: Run validate_target_files.py on target_files.zip files.
Test: PYTHONPATH=build/make/tools/releasetools python -m unittest \
test_validate_target_files
Change-Id: I170f14d5828d15f3687d8af0a89a816968069057
This commit is contained in:
Tao Bao
@@ -17,16 +17,25 @@
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"""
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Validate a given (signed) target_files.zip.
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It performs checks to ensure the integrity of the input zip.
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It performs the following checks to assert the integrity of the input zip.
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- It verifies the file consistency between the ones in IMAGES/system.img (read
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via IMAGES/system.map) and the ones under unpacked folder of SYSTEM/. The
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same check also applies to the vendor image if present.
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- It verifies the install-recovery script consistency, by comparing the
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checksums in the script against the ones of IMAGES/{boot,recovery}.img.
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- It verifies the signed Verified Boot related images, for both of Verified
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Boot 1.0 and 2.0 (aka AVB).
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"""
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import argparse
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import filecmp
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import logging
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import os.path
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import re
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import sys
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import subprocess
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import zipfile
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import common
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@@ -177,33 +186,152 @@ def ValidateInstallRecoveryScript(input_tmp, info_dict):
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logging.info('Done checking %s', script_path)
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def main(argv):
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def option_handler():
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return True
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def ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options):
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"""Validates the Verified Boot related images.
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args = common.ParseOptions(
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argv, __doc__, extra_opts="",
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extra_long_opts=[],
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extra_option_handler=option_handler)
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For Verified Boot 1.0, it verifies the signatures of the bootable images
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(boot/recovery etc), as well as the dm-verity metadata in system images
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(system/vendor/product). For Verified Boot 2.0, it calls avbtool to verify
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vbmeta.img, which in turn verifies all the descriptors listed in vbmeta.
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if len(args) != 1:
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common.Usage(__doc__)
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sys.exit(1)
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Args:
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input_tmp: The top-level directory of unpacked target-files.zip.
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info_dict: The loaded info dict.
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options: A dict that contains the user-supplied public keys to be used for
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image verification. In particular, 'verity_key' is used to verify the
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bootable images in VB 1.0, and the vbmeta image in VB 2.0, where
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applicable. 'verity_key_mincrypt' will be used to verify the system
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images in VB 1.0.
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Raises:
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AssertionError: On any verification failure.
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"""
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# Verified boot 1.0 (images signed with boot_signer and verity_signer).
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if info_dict.get('boot_signer') == 'true':
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logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot images...')
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# Verify the boot/recovery images (signed with boot_signer), against the
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# given X.509 encoded pubkey (or falling back to the one in the info_dict if
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# none given).
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verity_key = options['verity_key']
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if verity_key is None:
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verity_key = info_dict['verity_key'] + '.x509.pem'
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for image in ('boot.img', 'recovery.img', 'recovery-two-step.img'):
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image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
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if not os.path.exists(image_path):
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continue
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cmd = ['boot_signer', '-verify', image_path, '-certificate', verity_key]
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proc = common.Run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
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stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
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assert proc.returncode == 0, \
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'Failed to verify {} with boot_signer:\n{}'.format(image, stdoutdata)
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logging.info(
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'Verified %s with boot_signer (key: %s):\n%s', image, verity_key,
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stdoutdata.rstrip())
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# Verify verity signed system images in Verified Boot 1.0. Note that not using
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# 'elif' here, since 'boot_signer' and 'verity' are not bundled in VB 1.0.
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if info_dict.get('verity') == 'true':
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# First verify that the verity key that's built into the root image (as
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# /verity_key) matches the one given via command line, if any.
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if info_dict.get("system_root_image") == "true":
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verity_key_mincrypt = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'ROOT', 'verity_key')
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else:
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verity_key_mincrypt = os.path.join(
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input_tmp, 'BOOT', 'RAMDISK', 'verity_key')
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assert os.path.exists(verity_key_mincrypt), 'Missing verity_key'
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if options['verity_key_mincrypt'] is None:
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logging.warn(
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'Skipped checking the content of /verity_key, as the key file not '
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'provided. Use --verity_key_mincrypt to specify.')
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else:
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expected_key = options['verity_key_mincrypt']
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assert filecmp.cmp(expected_key, verity_key_mincrypt, shallow=False), \
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"Mismatching mincrypt verity key files"
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logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key')
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# Then verify the verity signed system/vendor/product images, against the
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# verity pubkey in mincrypt format.
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for image in ('system.img', 'vendor.img', 'product.img'):
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image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
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# We are not checking if the image is actually enabled via info_dict (e.g.
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# 'system_verity_block_device=...'). Because it's most likely a bug that
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# skips signing some of the images in signed target-files.zip, while
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# having the top-level verity flag enabled.
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if not os.path.exists(image_path):
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continue
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cmd = ['verity_verifier', image_path, '-mincrypt', verity_key_mincrypt]
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proc = common.Run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
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stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
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assert proc.returncode == 0, \
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'Failed to verify {} with verity_verifier (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
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image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata)
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logging.info(
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'Verified %s with verity_verifier (key: %s):\n%s', image,
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verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata.rstrip())
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# Handle the case of Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB).
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if info_dict.get("avb_enable") == "true":
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logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) images...')
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key = options['verity_key']
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if key is None:
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key = info_dict['avb_vbmeta_key_path']
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# avbtool verifies all the images that have descriptors listed in vbmeta.
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image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'vbmeta.img')
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cmd = ['avbtool', 'verify_image', '--image', image, '--key', key]
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proc = common.Run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
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stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
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assert proc.returncode == 0, \
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'Failed to verify {} with verity_verifier (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
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image, key, stdoutdata)
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logging.info(
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'Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
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stdoutdata.rstrip())
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def main():
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
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description=__doc__,
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formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
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parser.add_argument(
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'target_files',
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help='the input target_files.zip to be validated')
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parser.add_argument(
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'--verity_key',
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help='the verity public key to verify the bootable images (Verified '
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'Boot 1.0), or the vbmeta image (Verified Boot 2.0), where '
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'applicable')
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parser.add_argument(
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'--verity_key_mincrypt',
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help='the verity public key in mincrypt format to verify the system '
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'images, if target using Verified Boot 1.0')
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args = parser.parse_args()
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# Unprovided args will have 'None' as the value.
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options = vars(args)
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logging_format = '%(asctime)s - %(filename)s - %(levelname)-8s: %(message)s'
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date_format = '%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S'
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logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format=logging_format,
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datefmt=date_format)
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logging.info("Unzipping the input target_files.zip: %s", args[0])
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input_tmp = common.UnzipTemp(args[0])
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logging.info("Unzipping the input target_files.zip: %s", args.target_files)
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input_tmp = common.UnzipTemp(args.target_files)
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with zipfile.ZipFile(args[0], 'r') as input_zip:
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with zipfile.ZipFile(args.target_files, 'r') as input_zip:
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ValidateFileConsistency(input_zip, input_tmp)
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info_dict = common.LoadInfoDict(input_tmp)
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ValidateInstallRecoveryScript(input_tmp, info_dict)
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ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options)
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# TODO: Check if the OTA keys have been properly updated (the ones on /system,
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# in recovery image).
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@@ -212,6 +340,6 @@ def main(argv):
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if __name__ == '__main__':
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try:
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main(sys.argv[1:])
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main()
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finally:
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common.Cleanup()
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