When using Verified Boot 2.0, releasetools specifies a salt value based
on build fingerprint, so that to give idempotent images.
However, the change that removed static `ro.build.fingerprint` [1] broke
the behavior, as common.LoadInfoDict still relies on fingerprints.
Without a fixed salt, the first call to make_recovery_patch.py and the
second one (which writes IMAGES/{boot,recovery}.img) will see different
images, which leads to install-recovery.sh failure.
Note that currently there's a dependency that requires getting bootable
images through two separate calls. make_recovery_patch.py has to happen
first to get (placeholder) files in the system image. We then generate
canned fs_config files, and finally use add_img_to_target_files.py to
write the images.
This CL adds a quick workaround to force rebuilding the
recovery-from-boot patch while calling add_img_to_target_files.py.
[1] https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/build/+/892933
Bug: 134123803
Bug: 134525174
Test: TreeHugger
Test: Build a non-A/B target that uses AVB. Run validate_target_files.py
on the generated target_files.zip.
Change-Id: I5859e30be63bfd54398cf41fd2d907f15285f560
Merged-In: I5859e30be63bfd54398cf41fd2d907f15285f560
(cherry picked from commit 4978fa99d1)
The current solution expects BOARD_PREBUILT_DTBIMAGE_DIR to
contain prebuilt DTB files that are concatenated by the build system
to create $OUT/dtb.img. In order to accommodate devices that build
the dtb image locally, when BOARD_PREBUILT_DTBIMAGE_DIR is undefined,
make boot.img creation depend only on $OUT/dtb.img.
Bug: 133161451
Test: Build with BOARD_PREBUILT_DTBIMAGE_DIR undefined and verify
using unpack_bootimg.py that $OUT/dtb.img was included in boot.img.
Change-Id: Iae2c634ccdc1d83589b26d382882f75fb8565a31
Merged-In: Iae2c634ccdc1d83589b26d382882f75fb8565a31
In device root directory, we have the following symlinks:
- /odm/app -> /vendor/odm/app
- /odm/bin -> /vendor/odm/bin
- /odm/etc -> /vendor/odm/etc
...
This allows the Generic System Image (GSI) to be used on both devices:
1) Has a physical odm partition, where those symlink will be hidden
when /odm is used as the mount point
2) Has no physical odm partition and fallback to /vendor/odm/.
We can't just have the symlink /odm -> /vendor/odm, because the former
devices won't have /vendor/odm directory, which leads to mount failure
when the mount point /odm is resolved to /vendor/odm.
The existing /vendor/odm/build.prop won't be loaded in the latter
devices, because there is no symlink:
- /odm/build.prop -> /vendor/odm/build.prop.
Note that init blocks reading through direct symlinks (O_NOFOLLOW) so
the above symlink won't work either. This CL moves the odm build.prop
to /odm/etc/build.prop for init to load it (symlinks in earlier
components of the path will still be followed by O_NOFOLLOW).
Bug: 132128501
Test: boot a device and checks /odm/etc/build.prop is loaded
Test: make dist with an odm.img, checks $OUT/odm/etc/build.prop is loaded
Change-Id: I6f88763db755c9ec6068bfdd9cee81c19d72e9d7
Merged-In: I6f88763db755c9ec6068bfdd9cee81c19d72e9d7
(cherry picked from commit 6c62884000)
os_version is important for keymaster version binding, where it
refuses to perform operations with a key that is bound to an old
system version. This ensures that an attacker who discovers a
weakness in an old version of system or TEE software cannot roll a
device back to the vulnerable version and use keys created with the
newer version.
Previously, os_version for system.img is added into boot.img header
for bootloader to read the value then pass to TEE before booting the
HLOS. However, with project Treble to modularize each partition, all
images are now in the trajectory to be built independently (still
on-going). Also, in the Generic System Image (GSI) compliance test,
the os_version in OEM's boot.img cannot reflect the actual version of
GSI.
This CL adds per-partition os_versions into AVB metadata, which is
readable by bootloader via libavb without file system dependency. It's
still unclear for how os_version in non-system partition should be used.
We just add them for completeness here.
See more details in:
https://source.android.com/security/keystore/version-binding
Bug: 132233601
Test: build and avbtool info_image $OUT/vbmeta.img
- Prop: com.android.build.boot.os_version -> '10'
- Prop: com.android.build.system.os_version -> '10'
- Prop: com.android.build.system.security_patch -> '2019-06-05'
- Prop: com.android.build.vendor.os_version -> '10'
- Prop: com.android.build.vendor.security_patch -> '2019-06-05'
- Prop: com.android.build.product.os_version -> '10'
- Prop: com.android.build.product.security_patch -> '2019-06-05'
Change-Id: I21a77420f2e8a3456f7a8cae5158eb8fc41319e7
Merged-In: I21a77420f2e8a3456f7a8cae5158eb8fc41319e7
(cherry picked from commit 9b54801b58)
This reverts commit 842119ab3a.
Reason for revert: Rolling forward for Q-Finalization
Bug: 129975435
Bug: 129943426
Test: Build
Change-Id: I651e3ec68a765d3867be5341751cd536ccbe604a
(cherry picked from commit bed3e5262e)
