This reverts commit 5516d37f41.
The previous issue in unzipping non-matching files has been addressed
with commit a49054ca2f2959f50f3188914ec0faebc90ebcbe. This CL rolls
forward to allow dumping container certifcates for APEXes.
Bug: 128848294
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on target_files.zips w/ and
w/o APEX files.
Change-Id: I662aab3d96fc40ac8e5e206e32b73ac763220b70
common.UnzipTemp() calls `unzip` to do the unzipping, which will
complain if there's non-existent names in the given list. Prior to this
CL, callers had to do the work to remove non-existent entries. This CL
filters out the given patterns in common.UnzipTemp()/common.UnzipToDir()
to make callers' works easier.
Bug: 128848294
Test: `m dist` with aosp_taimen-userdebug (which calls
ota_from_target_files.py on a target_files.zip that doesn't
contain RADIO/*).
Test: `python -m unittest test_common.CommonZipTest`
Change-Id: I5e741c27ea8d0b8126c398a7e1b56a8deb4a3d7f
When TARGET_VNDK_USE_CORE_VARIANT is set to true, the vendor variant of
VNDK libraries are by default not installed. Instead, the core variant
will be used by vendor binaries at runtime.
To ensure the core variant of VNDK libraries are installed, we also add
a flag LOCAL_VNDK_DEPEND_ON_CORE_VARIANT to indicate that the vendor
variant module depends on the core variant module. This flag should be
set by Soong for all VNDK libraries without the vendor variant
installed. When the flag is set, the vendor variant binary is also
compared against the core variant binary to ensure they are
functionally identical.
As we are merging the two variants for some libraries, we need a new
link type to denote a module is usable as both native:vndk and
native:platform. We add native:platform_vndk for this.
Bug: 119423884
Test: With the corresponding Soong change, build with
TARGET_VNDK_USE_CORE_VARIANT set to true.
Test: Add a dummy VNDK library and a dummy vendor binary that depends
on it. Build with no-vendor-variant VNDK and check the core
variant is installed.
Test: Add conditional compilation based on __ANDROID_VNDK__ in the
dummy VNDK library and check build fails.
Change-Id: I40000f2728e8193212113c1ee950e9d697f2d40d
Currently system_other AVB public key is placed in system.img.
However, this makes it's harder to have a *generic* system.img
across different product configs. Moving the key to /product
partition to allow more product-specific AVB keys.
Device board config can add /product/etc/fstab.postinstall,
to mount system_other with this key in /product. It can specify
different mount options, file systems, verity settings, etc., in
this product-specific fstab as well.
Bug: 123611926
Test: `make productimage` checks the following is generated.
$OUT/product/etc/security/avb/system_other.avbpubkey
Also checks it's included in $OUT/installed-files-product.{json, txt}
Test: run the following command and checks that
PRODUCT/etc/security/avb/system_other.avbpubkey is updated:
./build/tools/releasetools/sign_target_files_apks \
--avb_system_other_algorithm SHA256_RSA2048 \
--avb_system_other_key external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem \
out/dist/*-target_files-*.zip signed-target_files.zip
Change-Id: I6804f29941bec54375d80bd68a5aedb5c23b842e
This commit updates how `check_elf_file.py` parses the symbol name
because the `llvm-readobj` (from clang-r353983) does not print "@" if
the symbol is not versioned.
See also. https://reviews.llvm.org/D56319
Bug: 128959554
Test: CHECK_ELF_FILES=true make check-elf-files
Change-Id: I0dee5e505225e57750a2c86cf0d25a151c218eb1
This CL adds support that allows treating an APEX as pre-signed. We can
skip signing an APEX with `-e <apex-name>=` and
`--extra_apex_payload_key <apex-name>=`. Note that the payload_key and
container_key must be in consistent state - either they're both
PRESIGNED or none of them is. CheckApkAndApexKeysAvailable() has been
updated to perform the sanity check.
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks.py with the above flags.
Test: python -m unittest test_sign_target_files_apks
Change-Id: Id1e2f3f2facd4a97a385983cc9b78c028f7e7e73
This validation is to help ensure that any usage of custom merge config
files does not accidentally exclude any item that has been added to the
default config lists.
Bug: 124197349
Test: Run merge_target_files with custom merge config files.
Change-Id: I34c51cb75212368146a2944d37621f311060d24d
This reverts commit d8469727bc. The script
is broken on target_files.zip that don't contain any APEX.
Bug: 128848294
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on target_files.zip w/o APEX.
OTA tools should pick up the avbtool, as listed in dict['avb_avbtool'],
from the current PATH (plus bin/ under the dir specified via `--path`),
the same way as handling all other host tools.
Test: `m dist`
Change-Id: I3eb4d2c61979b03d9c23b2403d9a38cf052d87ea
Also makes AddSystem check that an output_zip exists before attempting
to add the recovery patch to the output zip.
Bug: 128838154
Test: Running merge_target_files with --rebuild_recovery and verifying
it passes --rebuild_recovery to add_img_to_target_files.
Change-Id: I19347b2c0dabf29b7196045b18551b5d0687df2c
The keys_info in the touched code is a tuple, which is immutable.
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks.py with '-e foo.apex=bar' that replaces
the APEX container key.
Change-Id: I4e57e46c93a56b7f6646764d021ebb42c19bf7f5
A few tweaks to make it easier to extend to generating RROs in
multiple partitions:
- deduce the module name inside generate_enforce_rro
- dedup rule definition
- tweak framework-res check to use source module name instead
Bug: 127758779
Test: verify noop on presubmit targets
Change-Id: I2f0d6270b21f5427c372c04a5c6e7fb712e72a9a
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks.py to sign a target_files with APEXes.
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on signed artifact.
Test: python -m unittest test_sign_target_files_apks
Change-Id: I3fa13e3d9461cf5e0838e0572d436e218164fe41
(cherry picked from commit aa7e993a22)
Only the container certs will be checked and reported. For the payload
within an APEX, we can't easily extract the cert info.
It needs to go along a longer path, if ever needed, by:
- extracting public keys from all the available certs;
- using each of them to verify against an APEX payload to find a match
(`avbtool verify_image --image payload --key public_key`).
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on target_files with APEXes.
Change-Id: I2ef318e05433d2d65ab84e2dff9e01fb6ee3373d
(cherry picked from commit d8469727bc)
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run sign_target_files_apks.py to sign a target_files with APEXes.
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on signed artifact.
Test: python -m unittest test_sign_target_files_apks
Change-Id: I3fa13e3d9461cf5e0838e0572d436e218164fe41
Only the container certs will be checked and reported. For the payload
within an APEX, we can't easily extract the cert info.
It needs to go along a longer path, if ever needed, by:
- extracting public keys from all the available certs;
- using each of them to verify against an APEX payload to find a match
(`avbtool verify_image --image payload --key public_key`).
Bug: 123716522
Test: Run check_target_files_signatures.py on target_files with APEXes.
Change-Id: I2ef318e05433d2d65ab84e2dff9e01fb6ee3373d
